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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is based on Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) as 
a case transferred from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for consideration by this Appeal: 
1. a. Issue. Did the district court err in holding that there was a 
independent power of arrest in Miles Langley as a Colorado bail enforcement agent under 
the bail bond contract so that the Utah bond agent licensing statute Section 53-11-107(2), 
U.C.A., requiring a bond agent to be licensed could be ignored with the result that the court 
incorrectly instructed the jury on the law of arrest? 
b. Standard of Review. The trial court's application of law will be 
reviewed on a correctness standard with instructions to the jury reversed if an instruction 
was prejudicial in that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law. Butler v. Naylor, 1999 
UT 86, 987 P.2d 41. Jury instructions are examined in their entirety and will be affirmed 
if the instruction taken as a whole fairly instructs the jury on the law applicable to the case. 
Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 Ut. App. 35, 86 P.3d 752. 
2. a. Issue. If Defendant Langley was without a right to arrest because he 
did not have a Utah bail enforcement agent license, did the district court err in dismissing 
the cause of action for false imprisonment where the jury instructions pertaining to the 
power to make a lawful arrest were also contrary to law? 
vi 
b. Standard of Review. The trial court's application of law will be 
reviewed on a correctness standard with instructions to the jury reversed if an instruction 
was prejudicial in that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law. Butler v. Naylor, 1999 
UT 86, 987 P.2d 41. Jury instructions are examined in their entirety and will be affirmed 
if the instruction taken as a whole fairly instructs the jury on the law applicable to the case. 
Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 Ut. App. 35, 86 P.3d 752. 
3. a. Issue. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in declining 
to enter a default against Robert Thorpe when he failed to show for trial and had placed 
no excuse therefor on the record nor had he requested any accommodation of the court. 
b. Standard of Review. As explained in Valley Leasing, a Div. of 
Intermountain Loan Corp. v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983), the decision on whether 
a default should have been entered is a matter of discretion of the trial court with this court 
reviewing to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
4. a. Issue. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it ruled that 
plaintiff George Lee could not testify that he heard Defendant Langley testify in a justice 
court trial that Langley did not have a Utah bail enforcement agent license? 
b. Standard of Review. The standard of review in determining whether 
a court has ruled correctly on evidence is an abuse of discretion standard. Eggert v. 
Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 Ut. 28, 94 P.3d 193. 
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5. a. Issue. Did the district court err as a matter of law in refusing to admit 
into evidence the original of the receipt signed by Robert Thorpe by holding that Plaintiffs 
failed to show that Robert Thorpe was unavailable so as to not be within an exception to 
the hearsay rule? 
b. Standard of Review. The standard of review in determining whether 
a court has ruled correctly on evidence is an abuse of discretion standard. Eggert v. 
Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 Ut. 28, 94 P.3d 193. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Plaintiffs claim the following controls resolution of the issues presented: 
A. Section 31A-35-601, U.C.A. (1999). 
B. Title 53, Chapter 11, U.C.A. (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. This is a tort action by two men who were assaulted by 
a Colorado bail enforcement agent at the home of one of them in Utah for assault, false 
imprisonment, and negligence or reckless endangerment. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. The incident which is the subject of this suit 
occurred on April 2,1999. The Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint with the Eighth District 
Court in Uintah County on February 28, 2000. R., p.3. Addendum A All Defendants 
eventually answered the complaint with Defendant Langley answering pro se. (R., p. 22). 
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Defendant, Ranger Insurance Company subsequently made a Cross-claim on March 7, 
2002 against Defendants Thorpe and Langley. (R., p. 114). 
In March 2002, current counsel for Plaintiffs appeared for the first time. (R., p. 116). 
Counsel for Robert Thorpe withdrew. (R., p. 140). The case was configured thereafter 
with Plaintiffs and Ranger Insurance Company having legal counsel and Defendants 
Thorpe and Langley acting pro se. 
Discovery proceeded but Thorpe failed to show for his deposition and sanctions 
were sought by the Plaintiffs in August, 2002. (R., p. 171). The sanctions were never 
imposed after representations to the court by the wife of Thorpe that he had health 
problems. (R., p. 240). However, Thorpe also failed to respond to Request for 
Admissions. (R., p. 356). 
Trial was held before a jury for three days commencing February 2, 2004. During 
the course of the trial the court dismissed Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment. 
(Trial Transcript (TT) at R. p. 1187 at pp. 213-216). The assault and reckless 
endangerment claims were presented to the jury. (See Jury Instructions R. pp. 1032-
1034.) 
Robert Thorpe failed to show for the trial. The court denied the request of Plaintiffs 
to enter his default. (TT at R. p. 1187, p. 34). The court did grant the motion at trial of 
Defendant Ranger Insurance Company to enter the default of Robert Thorpe on the cross-
claim brought by Ranger and later entered a formal order. (R., p. 1261). 
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This Court entered final judgment upon Plaintiffs' claims on March 17,2004. (R., p. 
1067). A Notice ofAppeal was filed April 14, 2004. (R., p. 1143). Subsequently, Ranger 
Insurance Company caused a formal judgment to be entered against Robert Thorpe upon 
its cross-claim on October 13, 2004. (R., p. 1261). To be cautious about being sure the 
new judgment against Thorpe long after trial did not create a new appeal time, a Second 
Notice ofAppeal was filed by Plaintiffs on November 12, 2004. 
C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT. A jury verdict of no cause of action was entered 
against the Plaintiffs on February 4, 2004. (R., p. 1053). The formal judgment followed 
on March 17, 2004. (R., p. 1067). The judgment rendered was upon Plaintiffs causes for 
assault and reckless endangerment with the false imprisonment claim having been 
dismissed at trial as a matter of law. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
A. THE PLAYERS. 
George Lee, plaintiff and appellant is a resident of Uintah County, Utah. 
(Complaint, R., p. 3 and Addendum A). 
Gerald Lee, plaintiff and appellant, is the brother of George Lee and also resides 
in Uintah County, Utah. (Complaint, R., p.3). 
Miles Langley was a past police officer in the Grand Junction Colorado area, a 
sometimes bar bouncer, and a sometimes bail enforcement agent or bounty hunter. (TT, 
R„ p. 1187 at pp. 58-62). 
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Robert Thorpe was the owner of A-1 Bail Bonds located in Grand Junction, 
Colorado. His wife, Maria Thorpe, was also an agent with him. (Plaintiff Exhibit 2, p. 1. 
R., p. 999 in Addendum C). 
Ranger Insurance Company is an insurer operating as a bail bond surety for A-1 
Bail Bonds that had entered agency contracts with Robert and Maria Thorpe. Ranger 
Insurance Company was not licensed to be a bail bond surety within the state of Utah. 
(TT, R.,p. 1187 at 266). 
B. THE EVENTS. 
Gerald Lee was arrested for driving under the influence and driving without proof of 
insurance in late 1998 in the Grand Junction, Colorado area. He jailed in Grand Junction 
Colorado and released on bail issued by A-1 Bail Bonds operated by Robert Thorpe. 
(Gerald Lee testimony at TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 105-106). Despite posting bail, Gerald 
missed his court appearances in Colorado. (Lee testimony at TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 109-
110). 
Langley was hired by Robert Thorpe to go get Gerald Lee for jumping bail. (Langley 
Testimony, TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 73-78). Thorpe and Langley knew Gerald was in Utah. 
Langley left Colorado for Utah with the intent of enforcing a Colorado arrest warrant. He 
first checked in with local police in the Uintah County area and then went alone to the 
home of George Lee, the brother of Gerald, in Naples, Utah. 
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Langley knocked on the door and George answered. Langley said he was from 
Christian Construction Company and was looking for a good mechanic to hire and heard 
that Gerald was looking for work. George invited him into the house through a door into 
the kitchen area. Gerald came into the room and Langley again repeated he was from a 
construction company and had a job for Gerald and extended his had as if to shake hands. 
Gerald extended his hand in response and Langley suddenly produced and placed a 
handcuff on Gerald's arm. Gerald reacted by pushing Langley back and Langley, a very 
large man, struck Gerald. George reacted to protect his brother and grabbed Langley. 
The facts diverge here but the Lees say that Langley never said he was a bail enforcement 
agent and Langley admitted to that in the Answer he filed with the court, Langley Answer, 
(R., p.22). Lees were reacting to a stranger suddenly attacking Gerald. (See Lee 
testimony TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 111-118; 189-195). 
A short fight followed in which Langley beat up Gerald pretty well and left George 
unconscious on the floor of the kitchen in a pool of blood. Gerald testified that Langley 
dragged him out of the house literally by the heels with his head banging on the floor and 
steps of the porch as he was taken outside to Langley's vehicle. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 
117). 
George testified that he awoke and called the sheriff's office to report a kidnaping, 
still unaware Langley claimed to act under any legal authority. The police responded and 
cited both Langley and the Lees for assault of each other. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 194). 
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Langley took Gerald to the hospital in Uintah County for examination. A neck brace 
was placed on him and a general examination of his bruises was made. Gerald was 
released to the custody of Langley who put Gerald in his pickup truck and took him through 
a terrible snow storm over dangerous roads back to Grand Junction. Gerald was examined 
again in a hospital in Grand Junction. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 123-129). 
Gerald bailed out of the jail again by using Robert Thorpe. Gerald testified out of 
the presence of the jury that he saw Thorpe hand Langley the cash for bringing him back 
to Utah and saw Thorpe execute a receipt for the prisoner and note payment to Langley. 
(TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 276-278). 
A trial was subsequently held in the Uintah County Justice Court for all three 
Defendants at the same time. Langley was convicted of assault. George and Gerald Lee 
were acquitted of any crime. (R. p. 45). 
Ranger Insurance Company was the bond surety in Colorado for the Lee bail 
through A-1 Bail Bonds and Robert Thorpe. (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 1, R., p. 999). Ranger 
is not licensed to underwrite bail bonds in Utah. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 266). 
Plaintiffs brought this action against the Defendants for negligence or reckless 
conduct, false imprisonment, and assault. (Complaint, R., p. 3 and R., p. 322). 
Other significant events occurred just before and during the trial which bear on this 
appeal. First, Miles Langley died so his testimony was presented by deposition. Second, 
Robert Thorpe failed to appear for trial. The court denied a motion by the Plaintiffs to have 
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his default entered but granted the motion in favor of Ranger Insurance Company on their 
cross-claim for a default in judgment for failure to appear and defend. (Tt. R., p. 1187 at 
pp. 34 and 227). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs show in this Brief that their trial went awry when the court made a 
fundamental error in determining that there is common law authority for Colorado bail 
recovery agent Langley to act in Utah. Once the court decided that, Plaintiffs' false 
imprisonment claim was dismissed and their assault and reckless endangerment claim 
became impossible to win because the court instructed the jury that if it found Langley 
acted for Ranger Insurance Company that Langley had a right to make the arrest and use 
the appropriate force with that. 
This Brief explains that there was no legal right for Langley to act as a bail recovery 
agent in Utah which has licensing requirements. The court compounded the error by 
excluding from evidence testimony that Langley admitted to having no Utah license and 
by excluding from evidence a hand-written receipt Defendant Thorpe created proving that 
he had hired Langley as an agent to act in his behalf. 
Finally, this Brief explains that the court abused its discretion by refusing to default 
Robert Thorpe for failure to appear at trial where he had a pattern of not participating in the 
litigation yet the court was willing to enter the default of Thorpe on the cross-claim of the 
Defendant Ranger Insurance Company. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appeal presents extraordinarily interesting legal questions that can safely be 
said do not arise very often at all. Plaintiffs believe that a primary cause of the adverse jury 
decision was the way the court interpreted and applied legal principles governing the power 
to make an arrest. This brief will show that the court committed reversible error in its 
interpretation of the law and in ruling on two key points of evidence. 
B. THEORY OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs presented at trial through the evidence, a trial brief, and jury instructions 
theories of liability which they believe to be consistent with applicable law. (See R., p. 836 
and 985). This Court needs to understand the Plaintiffs' theory of the case at trial in order 
to appreciate where the trial court went wrong. 
Plaintiffs divided facts and legal concepts between each of them at trial because 
they had a significant difference in their legal status. Gerald Lee was a fugitive from the 
state of Colorado on a misdemeanor warrant. George Lee had no pending charge in 
Colorado and the entry and assault took place in George's home. Langley, Thorpe, and 
Ranger Insurance had no legal authority to be operating in Utah. Consequently, the arrest 
by Langley was without lawful authority and, in fact, specifically contrary to Utah law. With 
no lawful authority, the seizure of at least Gerald Lee and, arguably, George Lee by 
entering his home and knocking him unconscious, presented a valid claim of false 
imprisonment. Langley's acts without justification in law eliminated any defenses to his 
physical force constituting an assault. 
Finally, Plaintiffs relied upon a Utah statute that makes a bond surety responsible 
for acts of the bail enforcement bond agent to impute liability to Ranger Insurance 
Company. The doctrine of respondeat superior would also apply. 
C. THERE WAS NO POWER OF ARREST. 
1. Legal Framework. 
With the text contained in Addendum B, the court's attention is drawn to certain 
specific statutes in the Utah Code that were in effect at the time of this incident. Note that 
there have been some revisions to Title 77, Chapter 20 since this incident. All references 
are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in effect in 1999 when the arrest took 
place. 
Specifically, Section 77-20-8.5(2) provides that bond sureties may arrest a 
defendant at any time before exoneration at any place within the state. Note also that 
subsection (3) provides that a surety acting under this section is subject to the provisions 
of Title 53, Chapter 10, discussed below. (Addendum B). 
While Title 77 governs criminal arrest procedure, Title 53 governs the licensing and 
powers of bail enforcement agents. When one turns to Title 53, Chapter 10 as directed 
by Section 77-20-8.5, it is immediately observed that this statute is wrong in its reference. 
The appropriate chapter of Title 53 is Chapter 11. That chapter, known as the Bail Bond 
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Recovery Act, gives a comprehensive legal framework for the business operations of bail 
bond agents. What jumps out immediately is the fundamental requirement in Section 53-
11-107 that there are three classes of licenses and no person may act as a bail 
enforcement agent or bail recovery agent without holding a Utah license. Section 53-11-
108,109 and 111 go on to set the training and education requirements of bail enforcement 
agents and bail recovery agents. (See Addendum B). 
Title 53, Chapter 11, imposes requirements relevant to this appeal on bail 
enforcement agents in how they do their job. Section 53-11-120 requires a bail 
enforcement agent upon request to identify his employer. Section 53-11-122 states that 
in order to make an arrest a bail enforcement agent shall so identify himself to the person 
being arrested after notifying local police authority. 
An examination of Title 53, Chapter 11, shows that there is no legal authority 
whatsoever for a person not licensed in Utah to make a bail related arrest. Put simply, 
there is no exception for Langley enforcing a Colorado warrant in Utah. 
The best that could be said for Langley's legal status would that he acted in making 
a citizen's arrest. Section 77-7-3 provides that a private person may arrest another when 
there has been a public offense committed or attempted in his presence or when a felony 
has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has 
committed it. Section 77-7-7 declares that a peace officer can use force in making an 
3 
arrest only after the person being arrested flees or forcibly resists after being informed of 
the intention to make the arrest. 
With no state authority for a Colorado bail enforcement agent to make an arrest in 
Utah, the only remaining arguable authority for making the arrest is found in federal law 
and was a major issue at the trial as explained below. 
In Taylor v. Taintor, 89 U.S. 366 (1872) a person was arrested in Connecticut and 
released upon bail. His bail conditions allowed him to go to New York but, while there, he 
was arrested and extradited to Maine for a crime. The Connecticut court sought to collect 
on the bail bond and the surety attempted to avoid paying claiming that it was impossible 
to now bring the fugitive back. The court considered the nature of a bail bond contract and 
said in dicta that the bond principal or defendant is regarded as having been delivered by 
the state to the custody of the surety. The surety retains common law power under the 
bond contract to pursue the defendant into another state for return to the court, so there 
was no legal impossibility to excuse paying the bond. 
An examination of the trial exhibits shows that the Ranger Insurance Company bond 
forms completed in connection with the Gerald Lee bail recite a right to apprehend Lee. 
(Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 2, at R., p. 999 in Addendum C). 
Finally, of strong importance in this case is Title 31 A, Chapter 35, the Bail Bond 
Surety Licensing Act. In particular, Section 31A-35-601(2) provides that the acts or 
conduct of any bail bond agent or bail enforcement agent, or bail recovery agent are 
4 
considered to be the acts or conduct of the bail bond surety. Put in the context of this 
case, if Langley worked for Thorpe and Thorpe was an agent for Ranger Insurance 
Company, the acts of Langley and Thorpe are absolutely imputed to the Ranger Insurance 
Company. 
2. Langley Acted Outside the Law. 
The court ruled early on in the trial that the Utah licensing statute would not be used 
to determine whether Langley had authority to arrest. (TT, R., p. 1187 at 4-7, 9-12). This 
early ruling, before any evidence was presented, effectively mortally wounded the Plaintiffs' 
theory of the case, described above. Consistent with that ruling, Jury Instructions no. 25 
and 26 were given over the objection of the plaintiff's counsel. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 291, 
238,291-292). Jury instructions proffered by the Plaintiffs were rejected. (See Addendum 
D. R., pp. 901-906). 
The instructions given essentially inform the jury that the law was that if Ranger 
Insurance delegated authority to apprehend to Miles Langley, Langley had the power to 
lawfully make an arrest. (R., pp. 1028, 1029 in Addendum D). What the court did, in 
essence, was apply its understanding of Taylor v. Taintor to the effect that if Gerald Lee 
had entered a contract with the surety then the only issue was whether the surety had 
authorized Langley to go get Lee. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 215-217). 
This view by the court of the authority to arrest also caused the court to dismiss the 
claim for false imprisonment brought by both Plaintiffs. (TT, R., p. 1187 at 213-216). 
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There really is no doubt that Miles Langley did not have the power to arrest. As 
explained above, Utah has a comprehensive set of statutes in place which govern the 
licensing of a bail enforcement agent and even make it a Class A Misdemeanor to act as 
a bail enforcement agent without a license in Utah. Appellants are in a very difficult 
position because they are being asked to prove a negative. That is, when the court 
dismissed application of Title 53, it shifts conceptually the burden onto the plaintiff to show 
that there is no bar to an out-of-state person coming into Utah and making a bail arrest. 
Instead, the District Court should have applied the plain language of Title 53 and required 
Langley to have a license. 
Taylor v. Taintor does not provide a refuge for defendants. That case was decided 
in the absence of any express statutes which were put into play in the decision. Instead, 
that case can be read as having said in dicta there is a common law right of bail bondsman 
to pursue fugitives into other states. 
That Taylor does not have application here is found by looking at several cases in 
other states. In Walker v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596 (KY. 2004) the court 
considered the conviction of a bond enforcement agent from Ohio making an arrest in 
Kentucky without a warrant. The bondsman raised Taylor v. Taintor as a defense saying 
he had the right to come into Kentucky to make the arrest for the Ohio court. The 
Kentucky court rejected the argument completely by finding that the Kentucky statute 
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prohibiting the arrest of persons by bondsman without a warrant abolished the common 
law rule of Taylor. Similarly, the Utah Title 53 would abolish the Taylor common law rule. 
In McFarland v. State, 666 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa App. 2003), a bounty hunter from 
Iowa made an arrest in Iowa out of which he was charged with assaulting the subject 
fugitive. The bounty hunter raised as a defense the Taylor case pointing out that the dicta 
in that case creates common law that the fugitive can be pursued just about anywhere and 
the bounty hunter may break and enter his home for that purpose. The Iowa court 
correctly pointed out that the Taylor case lends no support whatsoever for the proposition 
a bounty hunter has some authority to break into the home of an innocent party and 
assault him or her. Similarly, the Taylor case would give no authority for Langley to enter 
the home of George Lee and assault him while apprehending Gerald Lee. 
In Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222 (Texas App. 1992), a defendant in a murder 
case raised Taylor v. Taintor in support of a mistake of law defense. The Texas court 
pointed out that Texas statutes governing sureties who seek to apprehend principals had 
replaced the common law of Taylor. Again, Utah has adopted Title 53 which also 
abrogates the application of Taylor. 
Finally, in Johnson v. County of Kittitas, 11 P.3d 862 (Wash. App. 2001), the court 
considered a bail bondsman who seized a defendant simply because the bondsman felt 
threatened that the defendant may skip on the bond. The bondsman relied on Taylor v. 
Taintor to argue that a surety had a right to pick up the subject as they believed necessary 
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to protect the bond contract. The court rejected the argument stating, as did the other 
states, that the adoption of a Washington state statute concerning the authority of a bail 
bondsman supplanted the common law rule of Taylor v. Taintor. 
In summary, no legal authority existed for Miles Langley to come into Utah and 
arrest Gerald Lee much less enter the home and assault George Lee. Utah has adopted 
an absolute requirement that those who seek to enforce bail bonds must have a license 
to do so after qualifying under Title 53, Chapter 11. With no offense committed in the 
presence of Langley in Utah, there was no right of citizen's arrest. The old federal common 
law right of a bail bondsman to pursue a fugitive in another state was eliminated by the 
adoption of Title 53. 
With all of the predicate legal principles in mind, the reversible error of the district 
court can be brought into sharp focus. Plaintiffs' theory of the case under Utah law was 
that Langley had no legal authority to be in Utah making an arrest therefore he could be 
liable for false imprisonment through false arrest, he could be liable for assault because 
he was using force in a situation in which he had no right to assert force, and he could be 
liable for negligence or reckless endangerment because he was purporting to carry out a 
duty without legal authority. By holding that there was a common law right of interstate 
apprehension pursuant to the contract documents, the trial court was wrong on the law and 
instructed the jury wrong when it said all they had to do to find lawful arrest authority was 
to find the contract authorized Langley to act. There is no known authority for the 
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proposition that parties can get together in one state and contract away the public policy 
and statutes of another state, yet that is what the court allowed in this trial. 
No stretch of logic is necessary to conclude that if the jury had been properly 
instructed that Langley had no legal authority to be in Utah, that they could have found 
favorable for the Plaintiffs. A new trial with the jury instructed consistent with Utah law is 
justified. 
D. FALSE IMPRISONMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. 
The elements of false imprisonment or false arrest were given long ago in Hepworth 
v. Covey Bros. Amusement Company, 91 P.2d 507 (Utah 1939). The court stated there 
that false imprisonment by false arrest occurs when any exercise of force, or express or 
implied threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, 
compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain or go where he does not wish to 
go, is an imprisonment. These foundational elements were elaborated upon in McFarland 
v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), wherein the court said that a lawful 
arrest must be done in accordance with "statutory dictates". 
Put simply, an arrest in Utah is a false arrest or false imprisonment where there is 
no specific authority to make the arrest. 
As explained in the preceding section, Miles Langley had no authority to arrest 
Gerald Lee in Utah. Certainly, even if there was some authority found in the law to arrest 
Gerald Lee, Langley is not given any authority to falsely imprison George Lee in his own 
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home. It is a question of fact that the jury could have found that George Lee, by exercise 
offeree of Miles Langley, was deprived of his liberty or compelled to remain by the force. 
The error of the trial court was to not even let the jury consider that false 
imprisonment claim through finding Miles Langley had a right to act under the common law 
surrounding the bail bond contract. The district court was wrong on the law completely. 
Instead of instructing the jury that if Miles Langley was found to be acting within the 
contract there was legal authority, the jury should have been instructed that Langley had 
no authority to act in Utah and the Defendants needed to show a justification for force or 
detention. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and remand for trial on the claim of false 
imprisonment. 
E. DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED AGAINST ROBERT THORPE. 
Plaintiff began the trial by moving to enter the default of Robert Thorpe who had 
simply failed to appear at trial without explanation. (TT. R., p. 1187 at p. 7). The trial court 
refused to do that stating that Plaintiffs' counsel clearly intended to ask that the jury be 
instructed on default that Thorpe hired Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee, which was a fact 
the court understood would be disputed by testimony of Mrs. Thorpe. Plaintiffs' counsel 
pointed out that Thorpe had essentially ignored the case throughout discovery effort and 
the practical effect to deny a default at trial would be to reward him for ignoring the court. 
(TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 16-19). Counsel further argued that the default of Thorpe could also 
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be imputed to Ranger Insurance Company as its agent. The trial court was unpersuaded 
and refused to default Thorpe, though it could have ruled Thorpe was in default but Ranger 
was not bound. 
Later, Ranger Insurance Company, which had asserted a cross-claim against 
Thorpe moved to have a default of the cross-claim entered for Thorpe failing to appear at 
trial. The court granted that motion. (R., p. 1261). 
The legal standard as to whether a default should be entered is that it is within the 
discretion of the trial court. Valley Leasing, a Div. of Intermountain Loan Corp. v. 
Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983). The question presented is, therefore, did the trial 
court abuse its discretion in failing to enter a default against Robert Thorpe. 
An examination of the record will show that Thorpe failed to show up for his 
scheduled deposition. (R., p. 114). The record shows that he came to none of the court's 
various hearings in the course of the litigation though he was clearly on the mailing list. 
Thorpe never presented any information to the court suggesting he would not be at trial or 
giving an explanation as to why he was not at trial. A fair inference of such conduct is that 
he simply chose to ignore the court. The unfortunate consequence of ignoring the court 
was that he got complete benefit of such conduct by having the claims of the Plaintiffs 
dismissed against him though he ultimately did get caught on the cross-claim by Ranger 
Insurance Company. 
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The court's concern the default of Thorpe could be imputed to the principal for which 
he was an agent was entirely misplaced. Ranger selected Thorpe as its agent and 
expressly made him an agent as shown in Trial Exhibit No. 2. ( R., p. 999). That principals 
are bound for the conduct of their agents is not a new concept in the law at all. Forsythe 
v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980). 
What Plaintiffs suggest to the court is not unusual in the law. In Murphy v. Crosland, 
886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994), this Court considered a statute that created responsibility 
for certain corporate acts in individual corporate officers aside from the corporation. The 
corporation had a default judgment entered against it and this Court recognized that the 
individual officers could be bound by that judgment under the statute that created 
responsibility in them for the acts of the corporation. The primary issue at trial was whether 
those persons had, in fact, engaged in those acts. That Ranger Insurance Company would 
be held responsible for the default of Thorpe is completely consistent with this case where 
the agency relationship between them is clear in the record and there is a statute that 
creates responsibility for the acts of Ranger's agents. 
That the trial court abused its discretion in not entering the default of Robert Thorpe 
is shown by the effect being to reward Mr. Thorpe for displaying contempt for the 
proceedings throughout and by the court choosing to disregard the law of agency. The 
court also ruled by anticipating the testimony of Mrs. Thorpe, which he had not even heard 
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at the time of the ruling other than to be told generally by Ranger Insurance Company that 
she would dispute that Langley had been hired by Thorpe. 
The correct ruling would have been to find that Robert Thorpe was in default and 
thereby had admitted the allegations made against him in the complaint. Those 
admissions which would have become the law of the case through the default were that 
Ranger Insurance Company is a bond surety company and Langley was an agent of not 
only Thorpe but Ranger Insurance, and that Langley assaulted the Lees unlawfully. 
(Complaint at R., p. 3). The only remaining fact issues for trial would have been whether 
Thorpe was an agent for Ranger Insurance Company and the amount of damages. 
Thorpe and Ranger were not just Co-Defendants in this litigation. The evidence 
presented by Ranger itself shows that they had a principal and agent relationship. Ranger 
clearly had a remedy against Thorpe for any damage caused by a default of its agent as 
established by the fact the court entered a default judgment in favor of Ranger Insurance 
Company on their cross-claim against Thorpe. 
The court's error is further demonstrated by considering the entry of the default 
judgment in favor of Ranger against Thorpe. What the court did in entering the default is 
recognize the agency relationship between Ranger and Thorpe existed so as to justify 
entering a judgment on the contract documents against Thorpe for Ranger. However, 
when the court refused to enter a default for the Plaintiffs against Thorpe, the agency 
relationship suddenly became a barrier to enforcing the agency relationship for third-party 
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Lees. Keep in mind that the ruling of the court denying the default judgment against 
Thorpe, as expressed on the record, was to protect Ranger Insurance Company even 
though there was a statute in place, Section 31 A-35-601(2), that would have reached the 
same result Plaintiffs sought by the default even absent a default. That is, Ranger 
Insurance Company is responsible as a matter of law for the wrongful acts of its bail agent 
and bail recovery agent. The court was construing away from the public policy expressed 
in Title 53 that bond sureties be absolutely responsible for acts of bond enforcement 
agents. 
The correct legal result for the court in this circumstance would have been to enter 
a default of Thorpe in favor of the Plaintiffs, hold that the default binds Ranger Insurance 
Company under its agency relationship with Thorpe and the applicable law discussed 
above. 
This Court is requested to reverse the trial court to order that the default of Robert 
Thorpe be entered and that Ranger Insurance Company, principal, be bound thereby. 
F. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED BY EXCLUDING LANGLEY'S JUSTICE 
COURT ADMISSION. 
Obviously, one of the key elements in establishing that Miles Langley did not have 
authority to arrest was the fact that he had no Utah bail recovery agent license. As has 
been pointed out above, the court completely ignored Utah's licensing scheme. The court 
added to the error through a serious evidentiary error justifying reversal. 
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As the record shows at p: 45, both the Lees and Langley were tried for assault in 
a justice court. A trial was held and Langley was convicted of assault and the Lees were 
acquitted. During the course of the justice court trial, Langley was asked if he had a Utah 
bail enforcement license. He stated in the justice court that he did not. 
Plaintiffs attempted to show by the testimony of George Lee that he was present in 
the courtroom in the justice court and heard Miles Langley say he did not have a Utah bail 
bond license. In fact, it was George Lee himself in the justice court doing the questioning 
of Langley. As shown in TT, R., p. 1187, pp. 200-202, Plaintiffs attempted to offer the 
justice court statement of Langley and the court found it to be hearsay, and refused to 
allow it, thereby eliminating plaintiff's key proof that Langley was outside the law in making 
an arrest. 
Counsel for Lees argued that Langley's status was an admission by a party 
opponent under Rule 801(d)(2) and a statement against interest under 804(b)(3), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Plaintiffs counsel also asserted that Rule 804(b)(1) excluded the 
statement from the hearsay rule as former testimony. (TT. R., p. 1187 at 201-202). 
The court said that former testimony under 804(b)(1) could only be established by 
a "document". (TT. R., p. 1187 at 202). A review of the case law does not show any such 
requirement. Utah has no case law on this point. However, Method of Proof of Testimony 
Given at Former Examination, Hearing, or Trial, 11 A.L.R. 2d 30 at § 29 states that the 
general rule is that the testimony of a witness in a former civil trial may be proved by the 
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testimony of any person who was present and heard him testify. The element that Langley 
be unavailable - he was dead - is met beyond question. There is virtually no Utah case 
law which suggests that the former testimony needs to be in writing and George Lee was 
completely free to say what he heard Langley say in court. 
The court does not give an explanation in the record as to why it did not find 
Langley's statement to be a statement against interest or an admission of a party 
opponent. It simply sustains the objection and the trial moves on. An examination of the 
rules of evidence shows that this key testimony should have been allowed. 
First, Rule 804(b)(3), U.R.E., states that where the declarant is unavailable, a 
statement which tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability is admissible. (See 
Addendum E). Section 53-11 -124 makes it a Class A Misdemeanor under Utah law to act 
as a bail enforcement agent without a Utah license. One would be hard pressed to find a 
more clear example of a statement being one within the definition of statement against 
interest. 
Rule 801 (d)(2) makes admissible admissions by a party opponent. The rule allows 
out of court statements where it is the party's own statement. Statements of admissions 
are not hearsay by definition under Rule 801 and are not exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
Langley's statement in the justice court to the effect that he did not have a Utah bond 
enforcement license is an admission of his lack of authority to act in Utah. 
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The court's exclusion of Langley's statement was later used in trial as justification 
for supporting other adverse decisions against Plaintiffs. (TT. R., p. 1187 at pp. 222-223). 
The trial court cited the lack of evidence of no licensing of Langley as additional reason to 
support the defense theory of common law apprehension under a bail bond contract 
thereby compounding the error. 
This ruling excluding the evidence of no enforcement license requires reversal of 
the case because it was a key element to show that Langley was outside of Utah law and 
thereby without authority to act. This Court is respectfully requested to reverse the trial 
court on this ground and to order a new trial as may be consistent with rulings on the other 
issues raised herein. 
G. FAILURE TO ADMIT THORPE'S RECEIPT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Another serious evidentiary error occurred when the court refused to allow Gerald 
Lee to authenticate a receipt given by Thorpe to Lee. This receipt was proposed Plaintiff 
Exhibit No. 5 found in the record at p. 986, Addendum F. 
The context of this exhibit is that Langley said he was hired by Robert Thorpe to go 
get Gerald Lee, that he got Gerald Lee in Utah, and that he brought Lee back to Grand 
Junction and was paid cash by Thorpe for doing so. Mrs. Thorpe testified that her husband 
never hired Langley, that Langley did whatever he did on his own, and that her husband, 
who had not shown up for the trial, would not have paid Langley anything. (R., Video at 
999). 
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This point was essential to the trial because Mrs. Thorpe was attempting to cutoff 
the chain of agency to avoid responsibility of Robert Thorpe for the wrongful acts of Miles 
Langley and also thereby relieve her surety, Ranger Insurance Company, from imputed 
liability. 
In rebuttal to the testimony of Mrs. Thorpe, Plaintiffs offered a receipt signed by 
Robert Thorpe showing that he paid $350.00 for the apprehension by Langley of Lee. This 
receipt was created in the presence of Gerald Lee who saw Robert Thorpe actually write 
it. Lee's proffered testimony at TT. R., at pp.277-278 was that he paid cash on his bond 
to Robert Thorpe with Miles Langley standing there with them and Thorpe, in turn, gave 
some of the cash to Miles Langley and wrote the receipt. The receipt said that Langley had 
been paid by Thorpe for the recovery of Lee exactly contrary to the video deposition 
testimony of Mrs. Thorpe. (See proffered Exhibit on 5 R., p. 986). 
Defense counsel objected that the receipt was hearsay. Counsel for Plaintiffs 
pointed out that this writing is an admission of a party opponent of a key element at issue. 
The admission being that Robert Thorpe paid Miles Langley for the apprehension of Gerald 
Lee contrary to the testimony of Mrs. Thorpe. 
The court responded in TT R., p. 1187 at pp. 276-285 after discussion that he could 
accept that it was an admission of a party opponent but then stated that the witness had 
to be unavailable and Mr. Thorpe was not unavailable. The court stated, at TT. R., p. 1187 
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at p.281 that there is "an interstate act" and Thorpe can be subpoenaed. The key evidence 
was excluded. 
The ruling of the trial court was clearly wrong and an abuse of discretion because 
of the prejudice it works on the plaintiff. Remember, the issue at hand is whether to 
believe the dead Langley that he was paid by Thorpe and Thorpe's wife testifies by video 
deposition that her husband would never had paid Thorpe. Plaintiffs can't use Robert 
Thorpe as a witness to rebut because he didn't show up for either his deposition or trial. 
The receipt effectively tells the jury that Mrs. Thorpe is dead wrong. 
Rule 801(d)(2), which governs admission by a party opponent, need merely be the 
party's own statement of admission and is outside the very definition of hearsay. There 
is absolutely no requirement about availability of the party and the court was wrong to rule 
on that point. 
The second problem with the court's ruling is the court apparently focused on Rule 
804(b)(3) concerning statements against interest. (TT. R., p. 1187 at pp. 281-283). The 
court looked to unavailability under that rule and said the plaintiff could not show 
unavailability because of the interstate compact concerning witnesses. An examination of 
the Utah Code shows that the only "uniform act" to which the court could have been 
referring to is Title 77, Chapter 21, titled "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of 
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings". An examination of Title 77, 
Chapter 21, shows that this statute governs obtaining witnesses from out of state in 
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criminal proceedings only. There is nothing in Utah law which gives civil litigants the power 
to subpoena somebody to come to trial to testify from another state. 
In short, the logic of the trial court was wrong on several levels. First, the document 
had been properly authenticated by Gerald Lee stating that he had seen Robert Thorpe 
write it. Second, the writing of a receipt of the arrest of Gerald Lee was a key admission 
of agency on the part of Robert Thorpe that he actually paid Langley contrary to the 
testimony of his wife and business partner. Third, there was no requirement of witness 
availability under the applicable rules governing this piece of evidence. 
A final concern ought to be that the practical effect of this ruling is to once again 
reward Robert Thorpe for not showing up at trial. The trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to default Robert Thorpe and then telling the Plaintiffs that a key piece of evidence 
cannot be admitted because they did not subpoena this defaulting absent Defendant to 
trial under a law governing criminal proceedings. 
That this error rises to the level of being reversible happens because of the context 
of the offered receipt in the total case. Put plainly, Plaintiffs got whipsawed. The jury was 
instructed in Instruction No. 25 that if they found Thorpe worked for Ranger Insurance 
Company and Langley worked for Thorpe, there was lawful authority to make an arrest and 
they could no-cause the Plaintiffs. At the same time, Thorpe was allowed to claim through 
Mrs. Thorpe, Robert Thorpe being absent from the trial, that Langley did not work for them 
and absolute rebuttal evidence to that point in the handwriting of Robert Thorpe done in 
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the presence of live witness Gerald Lee was not allowed. The practical effect of this ruling 
and the instructions given were to set up Defendant Thorpe so he could not possibly lose 
the case. If he was the agent of Ranger, which Plaintiffs always agreed he was, then there 
was arrest authority under the contracts and at the same time Ranger and Thorpe could 
deny Langley was their agent with evidence showing Mrs. Thorpe was dead wrong being 
excluded. This result is a clear abuse of discretion in the context of this case and 
constitutes reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is respectfully requested to find as follows: 
1. That under a standard of correctness the Eighth District Court erred in 
applying a federal common law right under the bail bond contract for a Colorado bail 
recovery agent to come into Utah and arrest and assault Gerald Lee and his innocent 
brother, thereby giving the jury a legal justification for Langley's assault on the Lees. 
2. Plaintiffs request this Court remand the case under a standard of correctness 
because the Eighth District Court committed reversible error by dismissing the false 
imprisonment by false arrest claim under a finding that there was a common law right for 
enforcement agent Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee in Utah and a fact questions remain 
as to whether George Lee had been falsely imprisoned, also. 
3. This Court is respectfully requested to find that the Eighth District Court 
abused its discretion in failing to enter a default against Robert Thorpe and asks that the 
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case be remanded with an order that Mr. Thorpe's default be entered and the binding 
effect upon the principal, Ranger Insurance Company, of that default also be entered 
whereby Ranger Insurance Company is found to be bound by the acts of its agent. 
4. This Court is requested to hold under an abuse of discretion standard that 
the District Court created reversible error when it refused to allow George Lee to testify that 
he heard Langley say in a justice court trial that Langley did not have a Utah bail 
enforcement agent license. 
5. This Court is requested to find under an abuse of discretion standard that it 
was error for the District Court to exclude an exhibit of the receipt signed by Robert Thorpe 
for the work of Langley in apprehending Gerald Lee where Langley had deceased prior to 
trial and video testimony by Mrs. Thorpe was allowed denying that the event ever 
happened. 
Taking all of the errors into account, this Court is respectfully requested to remand 
the case to the Eighth District Court for a new trial with the default of Robert Thorpe in 
place whereby the issue of a new trial would be limited to whether Langley was an agent 
of Thorpe, whether Langley assaulted or falsely arrested the Plaintiffs, and the amount of 
damages. 
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DATED this 12m day of November, 2004. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
G R E G ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees 
23 
ADDENDUM 
A. COMPLAINT A-1 
B. STATUTES CITED A-5 
C. EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL EXHIBIT 2 A-27 
D. CERTAIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND REJECTED A-43 
E. UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE A-57 
F. REJECTED EXHIBIT: RECEIPT OF THORPE A-63 
A 
Addendum "A" 
Complaint 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY UTAI 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT-V2RNAL,UTAH >U,AI 
UINTAH COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH ^ 2,8j£000 
LERH 
DEF 
^i^O (2 Zfons Af^ 
GEORGE M LEE * 
GERALD L LEE * 
PLAINTIFFS * 
v s . * CIVIL ACTION NO. fi()0 ffifl J&fy / " / £ . 
MILES WALTER LANGLEY „ 
Complaint 
ROBERT P THORPS * 
RANGER INSURANCE CO. * 
DEFENDANTS * 
JURISDICTION 
1,Jurisdiction is proper under U.R.S. 78-12-29 
PARTIES 
2.a. Plaintiff Georgee M. Lee has had legal residence at 1434 E. 4500 S 
Vernal,Utah since October 1998. 
b. Plaintiff Gerald L. Lee has had legal residence at 2281 S. 4500 S. 
Vernal,Utah since May,1998. 
2.a. Defendant Miles Walter Langleys0last known -ddress was 1264 Grand 
Avenue Delta,Colorado 81416 and was employed part time as a bounty hunter 
by A-1 Bail Bonds225 W. Grand Avenue Grand Junction Colorado, 
>>.Defendant Robert P.Thorpe A-1 Bail Bonds 22.5 W.Grand Avenue 
3rand Junction,Colorado.Where he is a Bail-bondsman. 
c.Defendant Ranger Insurance Co.is a bond surety company P.O.Box 
im? Houston,Texas 77252-2807. 
FACTS 
4.Both plaintiffs were at1434E.4500 S. Vernal,Utah 
5.Plaintiff Gerald Lee was unemploy^u at the tiaij end had been seeking 
imployment. 
6.At approximately 2:00 P.M.April 2,1999. Defendant Miles Walter 
•angley,being an agent working for A-1 Bail Bonds,and Ranger Insurance, 
•ntered the Vernal,Utah area of Uintah County with the explicit purpose 
f arresting and returning plaintiff Gerald Lee to Colorado on supposed 
elony warrants. 
7.At approximately 2:30 P.M. April 2,1999. Defendant Miles Walter 
angley approached the residence at 1434 S.4500 S. representing himself 
; Miles Langley of C h r i s t i a n Bros . C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. t o p l a i n t i f f 
>orge M. Lee, gained en t ry to the r e s i d e n c e . Langley to ld p l a i n t i f f 
iorge M. Lee t h a t he wanted to h i r e p l a i n t i f f Gerald L.Lee to work 
r h i s company. Upon being in t roduced to p l a i n t i f f Gerald L. Lee 
fendant Miles Walter Langley grabbed Gerald L.Lee around the neck 
d s t r u c k him in the head with handcuf f s . 
3 .-- l^ir . t iv \: George M.Lee at tempted to s t o p t he a t t a c k on Gerald L. 
e,and was s t r u c k i n the mouth and n o s e , w i t h Langleys elbow then f i s t , 
i c h rendered p l a i n t i f f George M.Lee unconsc ious and s e r i o u s l y b leed ing 
t h e f loor* 
9.Defendant Miles Walter Langley drug p l a i n t i f f Gerald L.Lee from 
,e r e s i d e n c e , l e a v i n g p l a i n t i f f George M.Lee s t i l l unconscious and 
eeding on t h e f l o o r . 
10*De fend ant Miles 7 a l t s r Langley a t no t ime when he was i n the 
s i d e n c e i d e n t i f i e d h imsel f as a bounty hun te r ,bond enforcement agen t , 
any th ing to do with a bond agency. 
LEGAL CLAIMS 
The defendan ts a c t i o n s were / a re a v i o l a t i o n of law under U.R.S.# 
76-5-103 Assau l t and B a t t e r y 
76-5-302 Kidnap 
76-5-112 Reckless Endangerment 
31A-35-601 Acts and Conduce ox Ba i l Bond Agents 
aims no t l i m i t e d to above s t a t u t e s . 
R e l i e f Requested 
1 . P l a i n t i f f s c o s t s for t h i s a c t i o n . 
2 . T r i a l by j u r y on a l l i s s u e s t r i a b l e by j u r y . 
3.Damages i n the amount of 
Compensatory ft 50f)fOOP Per Defendant 
P u n i t i v e it 500,000 Per Defendant 
Respect f u l l y ^ u b m i t t e d O 
George W.Lee DATE / ^ f . 2 ^ ZOTJD 
Vernal ,Utah 8 W 8 
Addendum "B" 
Statutes Cited 
Title 31 A, Utah Code Annotated 
VOLUME 2 
Complete through the 
1999 GENERAL SESSION 
LEXIS Law Publishing 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
Ai 
31A-35-601. Acts of agent. 
(1) As used in this section; 
(a) "Bail recovery agent" means an individual em-
ployed by a bail enforcement agent to assist the bail 
enforcement agent regarding civil or criminal defendants 
released on bail by: 
(i) presenting a defendant for required court ap-
pearances; 
(ii) apprehending or surrendering a defendant to a 
court; or 
(iii) keeping the defendant under necessary sur-
veillance. 
(b) "Bail recovery apprentice" means an individual 
who: 
(i) is employed by a bail enforcement agent; and 
(ii) works under the direct supervision of that bail 
enforcement agent or under the direct supervision of 
a bail recovery agent employed also by the bail 
enforcement agent, unless the bail recovery appren-
tice is conducting activities at the direction of the 
employing bail enforcement agent that do not require 
direct supervision. 
(2) The acts or conduct of any bail bond agent or bail 
enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail recovery ap-
prentice who acts within the scope of the authority delegated 
to him by the bail bond surety, are considered to be the acts or 
conduct of the bail bond surety for which the bail bond agent 
or bail bond enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail 
recovery apprentice is acting as agent. 
(3) The acts or conduct of any bail bond agent or bail 
enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail recovery ap-
prentice who acts within the scope of the authority delegated 
to him by the bail bond agent are considered to be the acts or 
conduct of the bail bond agent for which the bail enforcement 
agent is acting as agent. 1993 
kM 
Title 53, Utah Code Annotated 
/v# 
VOLUME 2 
Complete through the 
1999 GENERAL SESSION 
LEXIS Law Publishing 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
A'K 
^^-11-107. Licenses — Classifications — Prohibited 
acts. 
1) Licenses under this chapter are issued in the classifica-
tions of: 
(a) bail enforcement agent; 
(b) bail recovery agent; or 
(c) bail recovery apprentice. 
(2) A person may not: 
(a) act or assume to act as, or represent himself to be, 
a licensee unless he is licensed under this chapter; or 
(b) falsely represent that he is employed by a licensee. 
(3) The commissioner shall issue licenses to applicants who 
aalify for them under this chapter. 
X4) A license issued under this chapter is not transferable or 
wignable. 1996 
/HI 
11-108. Licensure — Basic qualifications. 
in applicant for licensure under this chapter shall meet the 
owing qualifications: 
(1) An applicant shall be: 
(a) at least 21 years of age; 
(b) a citizen or legal resident of the United States; 
and 
(c) of good moral character. 
(2) An appHcant may not: 
(a) have been convicted of: 
(i) a felony; 
(ii) any act involving illegally using, carrying, 
or possessing a dangerous weapon; 
(iii) any act of personal violence or force on 
any person or convicted of threatening to commit 
any act of personal violence or force against 
another person; 
(iv) any act constituting dishonesty or fraud; 
(v) impersonating a peace officer; or 
(vi) any act involving moral turpitude; 
(b) be on probation, parole, community supervi-
sion, or named in an outstanding arrest warrant ; or 
(c) be employed as a peace officer. 
(3) If previously or currently licensed in another state 
or jurisdiction, the appHcant shall be in good standing 
within tha t state or jurisdiction. 
(4) (a) The applicant shall also have completed a train-
ing program of not less than 16 hours tha t is ap-
proved by the board and includes: 
(i) instruction on the duties and responsibiH-
ties of a licensee under this chapter, including: 
(A) search, seizure, and arrest procedure; 
(B) pursuit, arrest, detainment, and 
transportation of a bail bond suspect; and 
(C) specific duties and responsibiHties re-
garding entering an occupied structure to 
carry out functions under this chapter; 
(ii) the laws and rules relating to the bail bond 
business; 
(iii) the rights of the accused; and 
(iv) ethics. 
(b) The program may be completed after the Hcen-
sure application is submitted, but shall be completed 
before a license may be issued under this chapter. 
(5) If the appHcant desires to carry a firearm as a 
Hcensee, the applicant shaU: 
(a) successfully complete a course regarding the 
specified types of weapons he plans to carry. The 
course shall: 
(i) be not less than 16 hours; 
(ii) be conducted by any national, state, or 
local firearms training organization approved by 
the Criminal Investigations and Technical Ser-
vices Division created in Section 53-10-103; and 
(iii) provide training regarding general famil-
iarity with the types of firearms to be carried, 
including: 
(A) the safe loading, unloading, storage, 
and carrying of the types of firearms to be 
concealed; and 
(B) current laws defining lawful use of a 
firearm by a private citizen, including lawful 
self-defense, use of deadly force, transporta-
tion, and concealment; and 
(b) shall hold a valid Hcense to c a n y a concealed 
weapon, issued under Section 53-5-704 1999 
/«'!? 
53-11-109. Licensure — Bail enforcement agent. 
(1) (a) In addition to the requirements in Sections 53-11-
108 and 53-11-110, an applicant for licensure as a bail 
enforcement agent shall have a ininimum of 2,000 hours 
of experience consisting of either actual bail recovery 
work, or work as a law enforcement officer for a federal, 
state, or local governmental agency. 
(b) The applicant shall substantiate the experience 
claimed under Subsection (1) as qualifying experience and 
shall provide: 
(i) the exact details as to the character and nature 
of the experience on a form prescribed by the depart-
ment; and 
(ii) certification by the applicant's employers, 
which is subject to independent verification by the 
board. 
(c) If an applicant is unable to supply written certifica-
tion of experience from an employer in whole or in part, an 
applicant may offer written certification from persons 
other than an employer covering the same subject matter 
for consideration by the board. 
(d) The burden of proving completion of the required 
experience is on the applicant. 
(2) An applicant for license renewal shall have completed 
not less than eight hours of continuing classroom instruction. 
1998 
53-11-111. Licensure — Bail recovery agent — Require-
ments and limitations. 
(1) (a) In addition to the requirements in Sections 53-11-
108 and 53-11-113, an applicant for licensure as a bail 
recovery agent shall meet all of the requirements under 
Section 53-11-109, but instead of the experience require-
ment under Subsection 53-11-109(1 Xa), a bail recovery 
agent applicant shall have a minimum of 1,000 hours of 
experience consisting of either actual bail recovery work, 
or work as a law enforcement officer for a federal, state, or 
local governmental agency. 
(b) The applicant shall substantiate the experience 
claimed under Subsection (1) as qualifying experience and 
shall provide: 
(i) the exact details as to the character and nature 
of the experience on a form prescribed by the depart-
ment; and 
(ii) certification by the applicant's employers, 
which is subject to independent verification by the 
board. 
(c) If an applicant is unable to supply written certifica-
tion of experience from an employer in whole or in part, an 
applicant may offer written certification from persons 
other than an employer covering the same subject matter 
for consideration by the board. 
(d) The burden of proving completion of the required 
experience is on the applicant. 
(2) An applicant for license renewal shall have completed 
not less than eight hours of continuing classroom instruction. 
(3) A bail recovery agent may work as a licensee under this 
chapter only as an employee of or as an independent contrac-
tor with a bail bond agency. A bail recovery agent may not: 
(a) advertise his services; 
(b) provide services as a licensee under this chapter 
directly for members of the public; or 
(c) employ or hire as independent contractors bail en-
forcement agents, bail recovery agents, or bail recovery 
apprentices. 1998 
53-11-120. Requirement to identify employing agency. 
Upon request, a Hcensee shall immediately identify the 
name, business address, and telephone number of the bail 
bond agency for which the licensee is an employee or an 
independent contractor. 1993 
53-11-122. Requirements during search and seizure — 
Notification of law enforcement agency. 
A bail enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail 
recovery apprentice shall observe the following requirements 
before taking action authorized under this chapter: 
(1) identify himself as a "bail enforcement agent," "bail 
recovery agent," or "bail recovery apprentice"; and 
(2) comply with the notification requirements of Sec-
tion 53-11-123. i9»8 
53-11-124. Penalties. 
Any violation of this chapter is a class A misdemeanor, 
unless the circumstances of the violation amount to an offense 
subject to a greater criminal penalty under Title 76, Utah 
Criminal Code. 1998 
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77-7-3. By private persons. 
A private person may arrest another; 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his 
presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has 
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has com-
mitted it.
 10fln 
77-20-8.5. Sureties — Surrender of defendant — Arrest 
of defendant. 
(1) (a) The sureties may at any time prior to a forfeiture of 
their bail surrender the defendant and obtain exoneration 
of their bail by filing written requests at the time of the 
surrender. 
(b) To effect surrender, certified duplicate copies of the 
undertaking shall be delivered to a peace officer, who shall 
detain the defendant in his custody as upon a commit-
ment, and shall in writing acknowledge the surrender 
upon one copy of the undertaking. This certified copy of 
the undertaking upon which the acknowledgment of sur-
render is endorsed shall be filed with the court. The court 
may then, upon proper application, order the undertaking 
exonerated and may order a refund of any paid premium, 
or part of a premium, as it finds just. 
(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the 
sureties may arrest him at any time before they are finally 
exonerated and at any place within the state. 
(3) A surety acting under this section is subject to the 
provisions ofTitle 53, Chapter 10, Bail Bond Recovery. 1996 
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I hava raad »rx$ had axpJainad lo ma and undaniland Iha loUowing larmi and condilioni of RANOER INSURANCE COMPANY (harainaftar callad RANQER) axaculing Iha abova lislad Suraly Bail Bondt on my 
bahalf: J 
I 
1. RANQER thai! h a U control and Jurisdiction ovar ma during Iht Itrm lor which my bail bond(i) ia aiKUlad and ihaH hava Iha right lo apprahand and lurrandar ma lo Iha propar official, at any lima 
lor violation of my bail bond(a) obligation* lo Iha Court and RANOER a» provided by law. 
2. It i i undartlood arjd agraad that any ona of Iha following actions by ma shall conslHuta a braach of my obligations lo RANOER and that RANOER and/or ils Aganl shall hava Iha righl lo forthwith 
apprahand and surrandar ma in jtxonaralion of my bail bond(s): 
a. I I I dipart tha |urisdidion of Iha Court without Iha.wriltan contanl of Iha Court ^nd RANQER, or its Aganl. 
b. I I I shall mova from ona addrass lo anolhar or changa my phona numbar without notifying RANQER, and/or ils Aganl. 
.NCT^OMPANY (hereinafter callad Company). *—> I I 
THIS AOREEMENT mada between Iha undarsignad 
harain aftai callad Indemnilof(s) arid RANGER INSURAI 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS. Iha Company hai executed, or it about lo axacula in bthalf of and/or al Iha instance of Iha indamnilor(i), Iha bond or undertaking daacribad in Iha lortgoirtg application, upon Iha tacurriy and 
indemnity harain providad, which application it haraby ralarrad lo and mada a pari of Ihia agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of Iha execution by the Company of »uch bond or undertaking Iha Indemnitors) covenants) and agreefs) with Iha Company at follows: 
1. The Indammlor(i) will pay Iha Company, or id duly authorized agent, the premium(a) ipecilied m said appficalion aJ the timet and in Iha amounts therein staled. 
2. The Indemnitor )^ wifl at all limat indemnify and keep indemnified (ha company and lave harmlait Iha Company Irom and agaimt any and all claims, demand!, liabilities, costs, charges, legal 
leas, disbursements and expanses of avary kind and nature, which the Company shall al any time sustain or incur, and aa wall from aN orders, degrees, judgments and adjudications against the Company by 
reason or in consequence of havirig executed such bond or undertaking in behalf of and/or at the instance of the Indemnitors) (or any of them) and will pay over, reimburse and make good lo the Company, its 
successors and assigns, ail sums' and amounts ol money required to meet every claim, demand, liability, coals, expanse, sml, order, decree, payment and/or adjudication against the Company by reason ol 
the execution of such bond or undertaking and any other bonds or undertakings executed in behalf of and/or at the instance ol the Indemnilor(s) and belore the Company shall be required lo pay thereunder. 
The liability for legal lees and disbursement* includes all legal tees and disbursements that the Company may pay or incur in any legal proceedings, including proceedings in which the Company may assart 01 
defend Mi right lo collect or to charge for any legal lees and/or disbursements incurred in earlier proceedings, 
3. The Indemniior(s) will immediately notify the Company of the making of any demand or the paying ol any notice or the commencement ol any proceeding or the fixing ol any liability which the 
Company may be required to discharge by reason of the execution of any such bond or undertaking. 
4. The voucher* or oth^ r evidence of payment by the Company, in discharge of any liability undar or incurred in connection with any such bond or undertaking, or incurred in connection with any 
collateral held by the Company, shall be conclusive evidence against the Indemnrtor(s) of the lad and amount of the liability of the Indemnilor(e) to the Company. 
5. In the event the Company executes any bond or undertaking with Co-Sureties, or reinsures any portion of any such bond or undertaking, or procures the execution of any such bond or 
undertaking, the Indemniior(s) agree(s) thai all ot the terms and conditions of this instrument shaft apply to and operale for the benefit of Ihe Company, the procured sureties and/or co-sureties and/or 
reinsurers as their respective interests may appaa$, 
6. The Company shaH have Iha right at any lime, without notice lo the Indemnitor )^, to transfer and assign this agreement and/or the collateral pledged hereunder, to any person. Reinsurer, Co-
Surety. Surety or insurance Company which may take over and assume in whole or in part, the obligation of the Company under any such bond or undertaking and (hereupon the transferee shaH become 
vesled with all the powers and rights given to the Company hereunder and the Company shall be relieved and fully discharged Irom any liability or responsibility for said collateral under this agreement. 
7. The Indemnitor(ft) agree(s) that the Company may at eny time lake such steps as it may deem necessary lo obtain its release Irom any and all liability under any of said bonds or undertakings 
and it snail not be necessary lor the Company to give Ihe Indemnilor(s) notice of any lad or information coming to the Company's notice or knowledge concerning or affecting its rights or liability under any 
such bond or undertaking, noiica of aN such being hereby expressly waived; and that the Company may secure and lurther indemnify itself against loss, damages and/or expenses in connection with any such 
bond or undertaking in any manner 4 may think proper including surrender of the defendant (either before or after forfeiture and/or payment) if the Company shall deem the same advisable; and all expenses 
which the Company may sustain or incur m obtaining such release or in lurther securing itself against toss, shaH be borne and paid by Ihe Indemnitors). 
S. The Indemnilor(s) hereby authofiza(s) any attorney ol any court of record to appear lor him or them in and before any court, in any action, suit or proceeding, and receive process on behalf ot the 
Indemnitor(s). or waive Ihe issuing and service of process, and enler or confess judgment, or permit judgment to be entered, against the Indemnilor(s), (jointly and/or jointly and severally) in favor of Ihe 
Company, for the amount of any forfeiture which may be taken against Ihe Company on Ihe said bond or undertaking and for the amount of any and afi sums hereinabove in paragraphs 1. 2 and 7 lalanao" to: 
and to release all error and waive isH right to stay of execution or appeal; and lo do and perform all acts and execute all papers in Ihe name of Indemnitor(s) in order to carry into elled Ihe authority hereinabove 
given in as lull and ample mannler as the Indemnrtor(s) might do if personally present; hereby ratifying and confirming all that the said attorney shall do or cause lo be done by virtue thereof and Ihe 
Indemnilor(s) hereby irrevocably wjratve(s) Ihe benelil or advantage of any and all valuation, slay, appraisement or homestead exemption law or laws of any stale of Ihe United Slates, now in lorce or hereafter 
enacted. I 
9. This instrument shall be binding not only upon Ihe Indemnitor (or Indemnitors, jointly and/or jointly and severally), but as waH upon Iha heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of 
the Indemnitors). j 
10. The Company reserves Ihe right lo decline to issue the bond for which application is hereby made, and no claim shad be made against the Company in consequence of its failure to execute such 
bond; nor shall any claim be mada in case the bond, if executed, be not accepted by or on behalf of tha obligee. 
11. The Indemnilor(s) hereby warrant(s) that the loregoing declerelions made and enswers given are Ihe truth without reservetion and are made lor the purpose of including Ihe Company to become 
surety or to procure suretyship on ihe bond or undertaking applied lor herein, with Ihe intent and purpose that they be fulfy relied on. 
12. The Company shaH hot be first obliged to proceed against the Principal(s) on any such bond or undertaking belore having recourse against the Indemnitors) or any of them, the indemnitors) 
hereby expressly waiving Ihe beniefrl or any law requiring Ihe Company lo make claim upon or proceed or enforce its remedies against Ihe Principal(s) belore making demand upon or proceeding and/or 
enforcing its remedies against any indemnitor. 
13. The acceptance of ttys Agreement and of the Indemnitor(s) agreement to pay premiums on the execution and on Iha continuance of said bond(s) on undertaking )^, and/or Ihe acceptance al any 
time by the Company of the other collateral security or agreement, shall not in any way abridge or limit Ihe right of the Company to be subrogated to any right or remedy, or lima any right or remedy which Ihe 
Company may otherwise have, acquire exercise or enforce under Ihis or any other agreemenl or by law allowed, and Ihe Company shall have every righf and remedy which an individual surely acting wilhoul 
compensation would have, all su<h rights being construed lo be commutative and lor Ihe sole benelil of the Company, its successors and/or its assigns. 
U. II any provision or provisions of Ihis instrument be void or unenforceable under tha laws of any place governing its construction or enlorcemenl, this instrument shall not be void or vitiated thereby 
but shaft be construed ami enlorctd with Ihe same eltect as though such provision or provisions omitted. 
15. • In making application lor Ihe hereinabove described Bail Bond we warrant all of the statements made on the reverse of Ihis instrument lo be true and we agree to advise the Company or its agent 
of any change (especially change! of address) within AS hours after such change has occurred and agree that any failure lo so notily shall be cause lor Ihe immediate surrender of Ihe delendant without any 
liability lor Ihe return of any part of Ihe premium. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF we have hereunto set our hand and affixed our seals this . 
THIS BOND IS NOT RETURNABLE 
Defendant Signatui 
JHE^PREMIUM PAHJLON I  
3 Q ...O, O O U ... RQ 
Indemnitor 
Signature 
Name 
•&td 
25 
ejPersi 
Tom 
Spouse \J(f\flY\£{ j Employer.. 
Referenc onal or Credit) 
Relation
 t 
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BAIL BOND UNDERWRITING AGREEMENT 
THIS; AGREEMENT entered into this 11thof March, 1998, by and between RANGER 
JSURANCE COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation duly licensed and authorized to issue surety 
ail bond powers of attorney in all bail states (hereinafter "RIC or "Company"), North American 
ail Bond Services (hereinafter "General Agent") and Robert Paul Thorpe and Maria Elizabeth 
horpe dba|A-1Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Agent" or "Bail Agent"). 
i 
FORAND IN CONSIDERATION of the promises set forth hereinafter, the parties hereto 
gree as follows; 
1. • DEFINITIONS. As Used herein, the terms "Company" and/or "RIC" shall be 
ltarchangeable and refer to RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY or its designee. As used 
ereinafter; unless otherwise indicated the terms "Bail Agent" and "Agent" shall be 
iterchangeable. As used herein, the terms "bail bond/1 "undertaking,M "bond," and "power of 
ittorney" sfjall be interchangeable unless otherwise indicated. 
i 
2. I GENERAL PURPOSES, Subject to the following terms and conditions, company 
•hall supply surety bail bonds to Agent. Agent shall at all times hereunder remain a duly licensed 
md qualified Bail Agent in Colorado as required by law. Agent may solicit and execute bonds in 
my area injwhich It is duly licensed, has been Issued a qualifying power and been duly appointed 
>y Compariy. 
i 
3. j RELATION OF COMPANY, GENERAL AGENT AND AGENT. The relation of 
Company $nd Agent Is that of principal and Independent contractor. Agent shall have exclusive 
control ov4r his retail bail business, shall set his/her own working hours, and shall retain or 
jischarge Employees or independent contractors In Agent's sole discretion. Agent shall not use 
the name <j>f Company in any advertising for in any manner which induces a belief that Agent is 
an employee of, or in any way associated with Company other than Company supplying bonds to 
Agent in a! wholesale manner. Agent shall receive no wages, salaries, or other compensation 
from Company. Agent is solely responsible for seeking out and obtaining any and all specialized 
knowledge; and skills necessary in his or her professional function, and is similarly solely 
responsible for the proper screening, selection and hiring of all employees and/or independent 
contractors retained by Agent. Unless Company otherwise notifies Agent, General Agent will act 
as Company's authorized representative with regard to this contract and Agent will perform its 
contractual obligations with Company through General Agent. Also, unless Company otherwise 
notifies Agent, General Agent will have the same rights of indemnification as Company as 
specified in this Agreement. 
018 
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4. ' POWERS OF ATTORNEY. Company, through General Agent, shall furnish Agent 
with bail bond Powers of Attorney in such numbers, denominations and al such times as 
Company shall determine. Agent shall not allow any unlicensed or unauthorized person to 
possess such Powers of Attorney, and upon receipt of Powers shall be solely responsible for 
such Powers. Whenever demanded by Company or General Agent, Agent shall immediately 
surrender or deliver to Company or its authorized representative any and all unused Powers or 
Attorney. Should any Powers of Attorney be unaccounted for, stolen, or otherwise lost, Agent 
shall report same to Company as unaccounted for, stolen or lost and unless otherwise directed by 
Company, shall within seven (7) days, of obtaining knowledge of such deficiency, make full 
premium remittance as herein described, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of each such 
Power of Attorney by Agent. 
i 
5. J REGULATION OF BOND EXECUTIONS. Company may, at its discretion, direct 
Agent to rjefrain from executing, issuing or renewing Powers of Attorney on behalf of any 
defendant/bond principal. Company may, in its discretion, set a maximum single undertaking 
amount limit for Agent, and Agent agrees he will not issue any bond in excess of said limit without 
first obtaining the express approval of Company of each such bond. 
6. [ BOND COLLATERAL. Agent shall solicit, collect, protect, insure, return, apply, 
deliver to Company and/or otherwise deal with such collateral, be it real or personal property, 
currency, securities or any other thing of value, as Company shall authorize and/or direct from 
time to tim£ or as is required to protect the interests of Company hereunder. Company shall be 
named co-trustee on any build up fund/reserve account, indemnity account, client trust fund or 
collateral account, and is the intended beneficiary thereof. All cash collateral taken on Ranger 
bonds will Ipe held in a separate cash collateral account and not be commingled with other surety 
funds. Company shall be entitled to inspect immediately all collateral taken and all such accounts 
of Agent, .along with any general business account(s), upon request by an authorized 
representative of Company. Company may, in its discretion, direct Agent to immediately deliver 
any and all collateral of any sort taken by Agent at any time as bond security to Company, 
identified by bond number, indemnitor and principal, to be held in trust by Company until released 
to Agent or directly7 to the party who gave such collateral, and Company shall be the beneficiary 
of same. Agent will hold such collateral as a fiduciary in a manner which complies with all laws 
and adminjstrative regulations of this state, and shall indemnify and hold Company harmless as 
to any action regarding the taking, maintenance or return of such collateral. Agent witl provide 
collateral indemnitor with a properly completed collateral receipt for each bail bond issued. The 
signed collateral receipt given to the Indemnitor will show "Personal indemnification only, no 
physical collateral, no cash" if no collateral is taken. Receipt will only be the receipt form provided 
by Compajiy as part of Power of Attorney form. Where Company receipt form is not allowed by 
law, Agent|will use only Company approved form, which complies with state law. 
7. BOND PREMIUM RATES, BOND COSTS, COLLECTION, AND REMITTANCES. 
Company jshall have the right to fix and change bond premium rates to be charged the public. 
Any premium rate increase, or related fee increase to the public shall be collected by Agent in 
accord herewith and remitted to Company as herein provided. With respect to bond premiums 
the following shall apply: 
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(a) Unless otherwise authorized and/or directed by Company, and without 
regard to premium credit extended to customers, Agent shall remit to Company within seven (7) 
days of execution of each bond all premiums collected for the Company by the agent. 
(b) The Agent's compensation shall be as may be agreed upon between the 
Agent and the General Agent per the attached "Schedule of Charges.11 
8. AGENT DUTIES WITH REGARD TO BOND PRINCIPALS. Agent shall be solely 
responsible for the negotiating, underwriting, securing and posting of bail bonds issued to secure 
the release from custody of criminal defendants, and for the apprehension, holding, movement, 
arrest, extradition and/or surrender of errant bond principals; court appearances of bond 
principals; and/or any and all other dealing with bond principals; all such actions and dealings by 
Agent shall!be conducted properly and lawfully in compliance with all laws, statutes, regulations 
and pruderit business practices utilized in the bail bond business. Agent shall be solely 
responsible' for any damages arising from, occasioned by, or in the course of an arrest or 
apprehension, holding movement, extradition and/or surrender of bond principals. Should any 
damages or legal action for damages arise from Agent's actions in the absence of written consent 
from Compjany, Agent's contract collateral build up funds and/or Indemnity funds shall be 
available fcir payment of any damages, defenses, or attorney's fees, and Agent shall hold 
Company free and harmless from any and all damages with respect to the handling, 
apprehension, arrest or surrender of any bond principal, or any other aspect of his or her bail 
bond business transactions. Agent shall exercise extreme care in all respects with regard to 
apprehension, arrest, or surrender of any bond principal, and shall exercise the utmost care and 
caution in ttye selection of person to assist Agent in accomplishing these various tasks. 
9. AGENTS DUTIES WITH REGARD TO BOND ADMINISTRATION. Agent 
shall be solely responsible for the satisfaction of bond forfeitures; Investigation of bond principals 
and prospective bond principals; negotiation, settlement and/or satisfaction of claims against 
Agent by bond principals, courts and/or others; and/or any and all other matters of bond 
administration hereunder. Agent shall make, or cause to be made, any and all necessary and 
warranted legal motions to preserve, reinstate and exonerate bonds, at Agent's sole expense. 
Agent shalltimely pay any and all cost assessments imposed by any court for bond exoneration, 
and shall b£ responsible for the payment of any and all judgments entered on bonds supplies by 
Company. J Agent shall not bring legal action of any sort in the name of the Company or its 
designee without the prior express written consent of Company. All legal actions and/or motions 
related to bjond forfeiture shall be brought in the name of Agent or his or her agency unless the 
laws of a particular Jurisdiction require otherwise, in which case Agent shall clearly designate 
his/her agejicy status in such action(s). 
10, ; NOTICE TO COMPANY OF PENDING ACTION. Agent shall notify Company in 
writing, within seven (7) days of Agent becoming aware of same, of the initiation or existence of 
any and allj legal or administrative proceedings wherein Agent is named defendant or the subject 
of the administrative action or investigation. Upon request of Company, Agent shall supply 
Company with copies of all documents related thereto, and shall supply Company with all 
requested (nformation. This provision does not apply to bail forfeiture or summary judgment 
matters, 
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11. NON-LIABILITY OF COMPANY FOR SERVICE. Company shall from time 
to time, as!a courtesy, supply Agent with a listing of Agent's bond forfeiture and shall, in its 
discretion and upon terms it may set, provide for the posting of transfer bonds for Agent. 
Company in no way guarantees the accuracy of said forfeiture listing; Agent shall maintain his or 
her own listing upon which agent shall ultimately rely. Company assumes to responsibility or 
liability for the transfer bond process, or notice related thereto. Agent acknowledges the risks 
involved with the transfer bond process and fully accepts same, holding Company harmless for 
any and all josses related thereto. 
12. AGENT RECORDS AND REPORTS. Agent shall maintain such documents 
and records and deliver to Company such documents, records and/or reports as shall be 
authorized ^nd/or directed by Company, and all such documents, record or reports shall be open 
and available for inspection by Company at all times. If Agent and/or Company terminate their 
relationship! hereunder, for any reason, upon request Agent acknowledges Company's superior 
claim to sajme and shall release to Company forthwith all records, documents and reports for 
photocopying purposes. Within a reasonable time thereafter, but in no event to exceed thirty (30) 
calendar d^ys, Company shall return said documents, records or reports to Agent, either by 
original or dopy in Company's discretion. Agent waives prior notice should Company seek court 
order to enforce this paragraph, and hereby stipulates Company is entitled to temporary, ex parte 
injunctive qrders without notice to enforce these provisions, Agent will provide Company a copy 
of any fornri or written communication associated with the writing of Bonds. Said information will 
be supplied for information purposes only, 
13. TERMINATION OF BOND LIABILITY. Agent shall report any and all 
terminations of bond liability, on a regular basis, but no later than fifteen (15) days after 
exoneration Any and all bonds exonerated by operation of law or by Agent Initiated motion shall 
be reporte|d, and the date of exoneration shall be noted. In Company's discretion, court 
documents, evidencing liability discharge may be required of Agent Agent shall comply with any 
request by| Company for status reports/updates on any large undertakings or forfeitures at any 
time Company so requests. 
14. PRESERVATION OF COMPANY'S INTERESTS. Agent shall comply with 
any and all procedural directions, rules, regulations and the like from time to time given and/or 
adopted by Company, and unless otherwise directed shall make no alteration, modification or 
amendment of any obligation or document of Company; enter into no settlement of claim in the 
name of Company; keep confidential any and all such Company instructions and information; 
make no reference to Company in any advertising; and do nothing whatsoever which may create 
additional pbligations and liabilities for Company and/or impair Company's goodwill. 
15. AGENTS EXPENSES. Except as otherwise set forth herein, Agent shall 
bear any 4nd all expenses incurred in the conduct of Agent's business. 
16. GENERAL INDEMNIFICATION. In addition to any and all liability the 
following (nay have at law and/or equity for nonperformance of this Agreement, they shall be 
jointly and! severally responsible to Company as follows: 
(a) General Agent shall indemnity, hold and save Company harmless for 100% 
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of the liabiljty written and collateral attaching thereto; and/or 
i (b) Bail Agent shall indemnify, hold and save Company harmless from 100% of 
any and alt costs, expenses and liabilities, including but not limited to, bond forfeitures, travel 
expenses (including food and lodging), telephone and postage expenses, special assistance 
fees, special employment expenses, investigators' fees, attorneys' fees, accountants' fees, 
experts' fees, collection fees, trial preparation expenses, court costs, penalties, judgments, 
judgment execution expenses and the like with Company may sustain or incur from time to time 
as a result of, arising from, or in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, including 
but not limited to, execution and/or administration of bonds; collection of premiums; forfeiture of 
bonds, audits by Company of and concerning any part hereto; investigation of bonds; negotiation 
and settlement of bond claims; location, apprehension, holding movement, extradition and/or 
surrender 6f bond principals; collection, protection, investment, transmission and/or application of 
collateral; negotiation and settlement of charges, claims and demands of whatever type and 
nature; and participation in any judicial proceeding, voluntary and otherwise. 
17. J SPECIAL INDEMNIFICATION. In the event of breach of this Agreement by any 
party hereto and/or any action by Company to enforce compliance herewith by any party, 
notwithstanding anything else herein to the contrary and in addition to and not in derogation of 
any and jail liability they or any of them otherwise may have at law and/or equity for 
nonperformance of this Agreement, each party hereto, jointly severally, shall indemnify; hold and 
save Company harmless from any and all damages, losses, injuries, costs, expenses and 
liabilities, including but not limited to, loss of profits, business assets and/or goodwill, liabilities to 
any party j hereto, liabilities to third persons, travel expenses (including food and lodging), 
investigator's fees, attorney's fees, accountant's fees, expert's fees, collection fees, trial 
preparation expenses, court costs, penalties, judgment execution expenses and the like which 
Company imay sustain or incur from time to time as a result of, arising from or in connection with 
such breach by any part hereto and/or such action by Company. This special indemnification 
does expressly extend to and include any action brought for tortious and/or intentional 
misconduct by General Agent or Agent, or by any person acting as their agent or on their behalf. 
18. j INDEMNITY FUND. 
(a) | As security for any an all Indemnifications set forth in paragraphs 16 and 17, and 
without limitation to scope thereof or liability therefor, Agent shall forthwith deliver to Company a 
cash sum'equal to 1% ($10.00per $1000.00) of the total amount of penal liability written for each 
bond. The initial and subsequent deposits into, and the income therefrom and the investment 
and reinvestment thereof, shall be known as the Indemnity Fund." 
(b) Neither said parties nor anyone else shall be entitled to notice of any action taken or 
to be takep by Company hereunder provided, however, that company shall subsequently account 
for and justify any such action taken in a manner consistent with proper fiduciary accounting 
procedure. 
(c) Company may from time to time, in its sole discretion and for such values as it 
deems appropriate, convert non-cash assets, if any, to C8sh either by sale or otherwise, and 
shall, within a reasonable time thereafter, account for and describe such action to Agent. 
(d)l Any and all taxes due and payable with respect to Income and/or principal of said 
fund shall, be paid by the party making deposits thereto. 
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(e) | Company may from time to time, withdraw, apply and/or reimburse itself with such 
part or all of the principal and/or income hereof as may be necessary (as determined solely by 
Company) to preserve and/or maintain said Indemnity Fund. 
(0 ; If. when and as Company is elsewhere authorized under this Agreement to 
withdraw, apply and/or reimburse itself herefrom by reason of indemnification, it may do so with 
such part or all of the principal and/or income hereof as it shall determine. 
(g) Upon termination of this Agreement and after each and every indemnification 
hereunder is finally exonerated, determined, and/or otherwise satisfied, that portion of said 
Indemnity Fund then remaining shall be delivered to General Agent, and/or Bail Agent free and 
clear of this Agreement. 
19. j COLLATERAL. As a condition of this Contract Agent, or if applicable, Agent's 
indemnitor |shall provide to Company collateral which shall be agreed upon between the Agent 
and the General Agent per the attached "Schedule of Collateral" which shall name Company or 
its designeje as beneficiary. This collateral shall be maintained by Company to secure and 
guarantee Agent's performance of all terms hereof, and shall be held, applied, liquidated and/or 
returned to, depositor in a like manner as is described and called for in the above Paragraph 18 
entitled Indemnity Fund." 
20. | INDEMNIFICATION REMEDIES OF COMPANY. When and as Company is 
entitled to (indemnification under this Agreement and except as provided elsewhere herein for 
bond forfeitures, in addition to any other rights and remedies it may have under this Agreement, 
at law andyjor equity, Company shall have the right to do any one or more of the following* 
(a) | Direct any party hereto so indemnifying Company to pay any part or all of the 
underlying ;ioss, expense or obligation. 
(b) | Pay any part or all thereof from the Indemnity Fund; and/or 
(c) j Pay any part or all thereof and direct and/or make reimbursement to itself in 
accordance with (a) and/or (b). All such rights of Company to reimbursement shall be primary to 
any such rights of any other party hereto. 
(d) ' Direct any party hereto so indemnifying Company to defend any action to protect 
Company, ;or to refrain from defending Company in Company's sole discretion. 
21.1 BOND FORFEITURES Agent shall give Company notice within seven (7) days of 
any and all bond forfeitures threatened and/or declared hereunder on bonds written hereunder 
unless Company has received direct notice form the court Agent shall take any and all 
necessary and lawful steps to terminate forfeiture liability within the applicable statutory time 
frame. Wnen and as it shall be necessary to pay any such forfeiture or resulting judgment and to 
the extent Company is indemnified therefrom, in addition to any other rights and remedies it msy 
have und6r this Agreement, at taw and/or equity, Company shall have the right to do any one or 
more of th'e following: 
(a) 
thereof; 
(b) 
(c) 
Direct any party hereto indemnifying Company therefrom to pay any part or all 
Pay any part or all thereof from the Indemnity Fund; 
Pay and/or direct payment of any part or all thereof from any forfeiture collateral 
held for such bond; 
/A'?« t\oi Company UL~ ("WanAra! An^nt t DA 
(d) ; Direct the bond principal and/or anyone guaranteeing, assuring or indemnifying 
Company, and/or any other party hereto against loss by reason of the bond principal's 
noncompliance, to pay any part or all thereof; and/or 
(e) ! Pay any part or all thereof and direct and/or make reimbursement thereof to itself in 
accordance with (a), (b), (c)f and/or (d). All such rights of Company to reimbursement shall be 
primary to any such rights of any other party hereto; any holder of interests in and to collateral 
described in (c); and/or anyone described in (d). 
i 
22. : PRESERVATION OF INDEMNITY FUND. The Indemnity Fund shall not be 
primarily liable for any Indemnification hereunder except insofar as Company may elect to satisfy 
same therefrpm or as otherwise authorized hereunder. Should Indemnity Fund withdrawal be 
necessary fof whatever reason hereunder, Company may, in its sole discretion, require Agent to 
reimburse said fund in the amount withdrawn, either forthwith or in installments as determined by 
Company. 
23. j FINANCIAL INFORMATION. Agent will provide personal financial statement to 
Company at Company's request Agent also agrees that Company may, at its discretion, request 
and receive [personal credit information on agent from consumer reporting agencies. Agent 
agrees to prdvide any reasonable personal financial information requested by Company. 
24. j ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. Company may, from time to time in its 
sole discretion, in whole or in part, partially or fully assign any and all right and/or duties 
established by this Agreement to any chosen assignee, with or without actual notice of such 
Agreement t^> Agent. Company may contact, substitute, or join with any other underwriter, surety 
and/or reinsured on any or alt bonds hereunder. However, whenever possible, such agreement 
shall be evidenced by addendum hereto, executed by all parties to this agreement. No 
assignment of any right or obligation hereunder shall be made by Agent without the prior written 
consent of Company. 
25. j SEVERABILITY. If any provision or item of this Agreement or the application 
thereof is he(ld invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items or application of this 
Agreement vj/hich can be given effect without the invalid provisions, items or applications, and to 
this end the brovisions of this Agreement are hereby declared severable. 
I 
26. j FAILURE TO DECLARE BREACH NOT A WAIVER. The failure of Company to 
terminate oq declare a breach of this Agreement on a particular occasion when such action is 
allowed hereunder shall not be construed, interpreted or pleaded as either an express or implied 
waiver of the right to do so at a later date, nor shall it be deemed an express or implied waiver of 
any right of Obligation hereunder. 
27. APPLICABLE LAW, VENUE AND FORUM. The Agreement is to be interpreted in 
accordance {with the laws of the State of Texas. The parties hereto do hereby consent and 
stipulate to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Texas for any action brought under this 
Agreement, j 
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28. ! TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT. Any party hereto may give written notice at 
any time, w th or without cause, of his or its desire to terminate this Agreement. Upon such 
notice, Agent's right and duty to solicit and executed bail bonds hereunder shall immediately 
cease and terminate. All other rights and duties of each party hereto shall continue thereafter 
until final determination and satisfaction of the entire subject matter of this Agreement (including 
the exoneration of nay and all bonds executed hereunder prior to such notice) and thereupon this 
Agreement shall be finally terminated. Until all Company bonds issued by Agent hereunder are 
exonerated or paid, Agent shall remain obligated to fully perform and protect Company as 
described elsewhere herein. 
29. , MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT. Each of the parties hereto acknowledges 
that this Agreement expresses his or its entire understanding; that there have been no 
representations made by any party hereto except as set forth herein; and that this Agreement 
shall not be subject to change or modification except by execution of another instrument in writing 
subscribed o^ by each of the parties hereto. 
30. I ATTORNEY'S FEES. Should any litigation arise between the parties hereto 
related to this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees and coks in addition to any other relief granted. 
31. 
received by| 
WRITTEN NOTICES. Any written notice given hereunder shall be deemed 
the addressee upon deposit of the same in the United State Mail with proper first 
class postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows: 
(a) If to Company: 
Ranger Insurance Company 
Attention* David W. Grobmeier 
PO Box 2807 
Houston, Texas 77252-2807 
(b) If to General Agent Indemnitor: 
North American Bail Bond Services 
Attn: Darrell Sutherland 
40087 Mission Blvd #386 
Fremont CA 94539 
(c) If to Agent and Agent Indemnitor: 
Robert Paul Thorpe and Maria Elizabeth Thorpe 
225 W. Grand 
Grand Junction, CO 81501 
32. i BENEFITS AND OBLIGATION OF SUCCESSORS. This Agreement shall 
continue and run to the benefit of and be binding upon the estate, heirs, representatives, 
transferee, i successors, and assigns of each party hereto unless such continuation conflicts with 
an express term contained elsewhere herein, or with the intent of the parties as determined from 
viewing thi? Agreement as a whole. 
Mb Company \Jtc_ General Agent 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed 
as of the day|and year first above written. 
By. 
RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY 
David W. Grobmeier - Assistant Vice President 
State of Ulti^f) County of j J c O b l i U ) 
Subscribed ana sworn to 
My Commission expires 
before me this MhJ^ai of ) Y"U A l U . 19 V Y 
(Notary Publicy^/ 
GENERAL ^GENT NORTH AMERICAN BAIL BONfo SE 
By. JuRtiJi fy/ft<\ 
State of Cl&hb rt^)L L <L. . County of _ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this __/_ 
My Commissioji expires* 
(seal) 
day of /) k *<3xy-~,. 19ycP 
/# t <C C c-
(Notary Public) 
rsssssssssssssssssssss 
^ 
CAROLE POWER 
COMM 11020190 09 
HOWYPUBUC-CAUrOfWA >-* 
VENTURA COUNTY ^ 
My Comm Expires Mar n l , 1998 w 
/HI 
BAIL AGENT C/f~*4 
't (X*j 4£~~~~^Z / 
&,-?*><* ~?//o<y& 
BAIL AGENt 
(print name) 
State -_£ 4 
County of AJJl/~ ru-^J^i. J 
^lobe a^ 
£i Kr ^ / u a ) 
)ss. 
On ftYarcL. l\ \c\c\% before me, L l A c i d c U . ^ t i d e i ( a . w 
The undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 01a . c.4 q. Tin, n r o e ^u.<l 
I - A <>•< p<- , or proved to me on the basis of 
satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name jafare subscnbed to the within instrument and acknowledged 
to me that t4/sheAhey executed the same in bts«»er/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by hw/hef/their 
signature(s) or) the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the 
instrument. ! 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
(signature of Notary Public) 
(seal) 
CIAUDEH.SUTHEW£N° 
^wSKcOUNIV 
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Addendum "D" 
Certain Jury Instructions Given and Rejected 
AH3 
Instructions Given 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2$ 
You are instructed that if you find that Ranger delegated authority to apprehend 
Gerald Lee to Miles Langley, he had the power to lawfully make an arrest. 
INSTRUCTION NO, X \ * 
If you find the airest was lawful, it was the obligation of the person being arrested to 
submit to That arrest. 
A - ^ 
Plaintiffs' Instructions Rejected 
A'MI 
INSTRUCTION NO. f 
FALSE IMPRISONMENT INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiff claims the Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned by the Defendant and 
suffered injuries as a result in one or more of the following respects: Gerald Lee claims 
that Miles Langley had no legal authority to act as a bail enforcement agent in the state 
of Utah. Mr. Lee further claims that when Miles Langley took custody of him by force that 
a false imprisonment occurred. 
George Lee claims that Miles Langley had no legal authority to enforce a bail bond 
in the state of Utah and when he entered the home of George Lee and physically 
assaulted Mr. Lee that he acted with the intent to confine or restrain George Lee. 
Miles Langley has denied that he acted wrongfully. 
Reference: 
MUJ110.14 
A ' ^ l 
INSTRUCTION NO. _k 
FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following elements to prevail on 
a claim of false imprisonment: 
1. The Defendant acted, intending to confine or restrain the Plaintiff; and 
2. The Defendant's actions resulted in the confinement or restraint of the 
Plaintiff; and 
3. The Plaintiff was conscious of the confinement or restraint or was 
harmed by it; and 
4. The Defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe 
the Plaintiff committed an offense. 
A person is restrained when that person is not free, or reasonably believes [he] 
[she] [they] person is not free, to leave a place to which that person has been confined 
and does not consent to the restraint. 
References: 
MUJ110.15 
Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) 
Haas v. Emmett, 23 Utah 2d 138,459 P.2d 432 (1969) 
Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962) 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1964) 
IJI § 42.34 
h'W 
INSTRUCTION NO. V 
Be advised that Utah law requires that a bail recovery agent operate only when 
licensed by the state of Utah. 
Reference: 
Title 53, Chapter 11, UCA. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. <f 
Be advised that Utah law allows citizens without law enforcement authority to make 
arrests. The law provides, however, that such arrests may be made by private persons 
only where there has been a public offense committed or attempted in his presence or 
when a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
arrested has committed it. 
Reference: 
Section 77-7-3, UCA 
yq\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
NEGLIGENCE - INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION 
In this case the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant was negligent in the following 
respects: Miles Langley, acting without benefit of a required license and legal authority 
entered the premises of George Lee to make an arrest without authority and engaged in 
a fight which caused the Plaintiffs' injuries. 
To return a verdict for the Plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that: 
1. The Defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged 
by the Plaintiff; and 
2. The Defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's 
injuries. 
If you find in favor of the Plaintiff on those two questions, you must then decide the 
amount of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff. 
References: 
MUJI 3.1 
JIFUNo.2.4(1957) 
A'^" 
INSTRUCTION NO. [6 
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT 
A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or 
property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care 
does not require extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an 
ordinary, prudent person uses in similar situations. 
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation. You 
must decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation. 
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act. 
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent conduct 
may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or damages. 
References: 
MUJI 3.2 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) 
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981) 
Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252,461 P.2d 466 (1969) 
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964) 
JIFU Nos. 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4 (1957) 
BAJI Nos. 3.00 (1986), 3.10 (1986), 3.11 (Supp. 1992), 3.12 (Supp. 1992) 
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Addendum"E" 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
A^"7 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
UTAH COURT RULES 
1999 
State and Federal Rules 
and Code of Judicial 
Administration 
LEXIS* 
LAW PUBLISHING 
P.O. Box 7587, Charlottesville, VA 22906-7587 
www.kxislawpublishing.com 
Customer Service: 800/562-1197 
h"ft 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is ofTered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
<C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered against a party 
$nd is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
ar belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
hb\ 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situ-
ations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's state-
ment has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing 
the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop-the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal" action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it 
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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on behalf of the defendant 
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(ADDRESS) 
/L As security for the execution of this Bail Bond written in the 
TT i_i i BY (Print Name). 
(Signature). 
Said Col 
Bail Bo: 
is deposited as security for the payment of any sums which may become due to the Agency or the "Surety" by the terms of the 
lieenjHPaxecuted by the said Defendant and Indemnitors, all of the terms of which are made a part of this receipt by this reference. 
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npany will not be responsible for cash or other valuables in connection with this bond unless listed in the appropriate collateral or premium portions of this form. I 
The above conditions are agreed to 
(DEPOSITOR) (DEPOSITOR) 
RECEIPT FOR The undersigned hereby surrenders the original of this collateral receipt and acknowledges the return and receipt of all collateral 
RETURN OF COLLATERAL listed above. The collateral has been returned in good and sufficient condition and the depositor(s) hereby relieves the surety 
agent and the surety company from any further liability or responsibility in relation to the collateral. 
RETURNED BYiu 
) 
DATE. 
ACCEPTED BY:. 
DEPOSITOR SIGNATURE 
ACCEPTED BY:. 
DEPOSITOR SIGNATURE 
nmcaom) 
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Was Collateral taken: (YES), pNOHB If \s, only use collateral receipt furnished above. 
Name and Address of Bail Bond Agency 
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MEMORANDUM OF BAIL BOND FURNISHED 
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***R5 1104S785** 
TOTAL CHARGES 
•' si ^ 
RECEIVED ON ACCOUNT 
$ (/ 
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t~ 7-
Date Released. 
Case No 
A, f-0 . T 9 Date to ADnear 
>VC !t'-: 
Received Copy of above Receipt and MP 
23B (10/94) 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the \ 7#day of November, 2004, two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, first class, 
postage pre-paid to: 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert P. Thorpe 
30471/2 A1/2 Road 
Grand Junction, CO 81503 
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